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the utmost scrutiny in ensuring that a defendant's decision to pro-
ceed pro se is an informed one, the Mirenda holding is fair to both
the pro se defendant and the criminal justice system.111
Donna M. Hitscherich
An employee who is hired for no specific duration but who has
received assurances that he would not be terminated without just
cause may maintain a breach of contract action for wrongful
termination
Pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine,112 unless the du-
ration of employment is specified, the employment relationship
standby counsel is "'to be seen, but not heard."' Id. at 273. The Wiggins Court further
amplified this position by stating that "[standby counsel] is not to compete with the defen-
dant or supersede his defense, [but] [r]ather, his presence is there for advisory purposes
only, to be used or not used as the defendant sees fit." Id. (footnotes omitted).
"I A pro se defendant essentially is held to the same standards of courtroom procedure
as is a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Duja-
novic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir. 1973). Pragmatically, however, trial judges sometimes at-
tempt to aid the pro se defendant. See, e.g., Grubbs v. State, 255 Ind. 411, 416, 265 N.E.2d
40, 43-44 (1970). Furthermore, a judge who presides over a criminal trial being conducted by
a pro se defendant "must be especially acute and vigilant in governing the conduct of coun-
sel and witnesses ...... Id., 265 N.E.2d at 44. The defendant, moreover, may not use his
constitutional right to appear pro se in order to disrupt the court proceedings. See Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). Thus, in the interests of an orderly trial proce-
dure, a trial judge may be prompted to appoint standby counsel for a pro se defendant
United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971).
12 The employment-at-will doctrine was derived from the common-law principles of
master and servant which existed until the middle of the 19th century. See generally
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404, 1416 (1967); Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment Law, At-Will Employment and the Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. CrTy N.Y. 170,
170-71 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Labor Law]; DeGiuseppe, The Effect of
the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10
FoRDHAM URs. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1981-1982); Feerick, Employment At Will, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1979,
at 1, col. 1; Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. 118, 118-20, 122-23 (1976); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1816, 1824 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as HARvARD Note]. English common law regarded the employment rela-
tionship as founded upon contract principles. When an employee was hired for an indefinite
period, the term of employment was presumed to be 1 year. See Committee on Labor Law,
supra, at 171; DeGiuseppe, supra, at 4; Feinman, supra, at 120. The English rule was ac-
cepted generally in the United States until the end of the 19th century. See Committee on
Labor Law, supra, at 171; DeGiuseppe, supra, at 5-6; Feinman, supra, at 122; see also Ad-
ams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 127, 129, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891). At that time, the laissez-faire
political and economic theory that developed from American industrial growth significantly
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may be terminated by either party at any time, for any or no rea-
son. 115 Nevertheless, hired-at-will employees have sought recovery
for wrongful termination on the grounds of abusive discharge,114
affected the employment relationship. See Feinman, supra, at 124-25; HARVARD Note, supra,
at 1825-26. The new industrial era favored self-reliance, social freedom and economic indi-
vidualism. HARVARD Note, supra, at 1826. Consequently, there existed fewer commitments
between the employer and the employee, and the notions of mutual responsibility and job
security were largely abandoned. Id. at 1825. The American concept of employment at will
thus provided that a general hiring for an indefinite period was terminable at any time,
rather than a hiring for a term of 1 year. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1981); see Committee on Labor Law, supra, at 171.
The rule gained wide acceptance in the United States, and the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the employer's right to discharge was a constitutionally protected property right
and that he could purchase labor under the conditions he desires. See Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908); Blades, supra,
at 1416-17. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the rule in Martin v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895).
u3 E.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); James v. Board of Educ., 37 N.Y.2d 891, 892, 340 N.E.2d 735,
735, 378 N.Y.S.2d 371, 371 (1975); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42
N.E.2d 416, 417 (1895). Consistent with a laissez-faire theory, the at-will doctrine as formu-
lated by the American courts provided that the parties were free to contract in order to
reach a bargain that would satisfy both the employer and the employee. See Note, Judicial
Limitation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 552, 554-55 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ST. JOHN'S Note]. Thus, the rule was premised on the principle of mu-
tuality of obligation; it was argued that because the employee was free to leave at will and
for any or no reason, the employer was also free to terminate the employment relationship
in such a manner. See Blades, supra note 112, at 1419; Committee on Labor Law, supra
note 112, at 172, 174; ST. JOHN'S Note, supra, at 555. The employment-at-will doctrine,
based on contract principles, presumed equal bargaining positions between the employer
and the employee. See Feinman, supra note 112, at 124-25; ST. JOHN'S Note, supra, at 555-
56. As industry and technology developed, however, it became apparent that there was a
disparity in bargaining positions, clearly favoring the employer. This was due in part to the
fact that advancing technology required the worker to specialize, thus decreasing his mobil-
ity. See Blades, supra note 112, at 1405; ST. JOHN'S Note, supra, at 557. See generally Note,
A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435,
1443 (1975) ("folnly the most unusual [hired-at-will] employee possesses the sufficient bar-
gaining power to insist upon a restriction of the dismissal power") [hereinafter cited as HAs-
TINGS Note].
"' See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 426
(1973); Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 187, 344 P.2d
25, 26, 28 (1959). The New York courts have not yet recognized a cause of action for abusive
discharge. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 88 App. Div. 2d 870, 870, 451
N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't 1982); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 App. Div. 2d 553, 553-54,
425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1st Dep't 1980); Marinzulich v. National Bank of N. Am., 73 App.
Div. 2d 886, 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1014 (1st Dep't 1979); Stewart v. Albert Einstein Col-
lege of Medicine, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1982, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1982); Chin v.
AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1075,410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 741 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
App. Div. 2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979). The Chin court acknowledged the
possibility of recognizing a cause of action under the appropriate circumstances, however, in
stating that "[tihe doctrine of abusive discharge places upon the plaintiff the burden of
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intentional infliction of emotional harm," 5 prima facie tort,116 and
persuading this court that (1) there is a public policy of this State that (2) was violated by
the defendant." 96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741. Moreover, in Murphy, while it
was held that the plaintiff failed to show a violation that has been recognized as supporting
a cause of action in other jurisdictions, the possibility of New York recognizing an abusive
discharge action was not foreclosed. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 88 App. Div.
2d 870, 870, 451 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't 1982).
In contrast to the New York state courts, federal courts applying New York law have
upheld actions on the abusive discharge theory in cases where the employee's termination
contravened public policy. See, e.g., Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving a violation of New York's public policy concerning age discrimi-
nation); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (employer held
liable for abusive discharge in terminating an employee in order to avoid the vesting of his
pension plan). Justifying such a holding, the Savodnik court stated "[w]hile no case in New
York has yet recognized the tort of abusive discharge, precedent does suggest New York
courts will do so when presented with the proper case." 488 F. Supp. at 826. In addition, it
has been stated that in New York, one would be "wrong in asserting that an employee may
never sue for improper termination of a contract at will [under] a tort claim for abusive
discharge." Placos, 517 F. Supp. at 1289.
Finally, other jurisdictions have upheld abusive discharge claims where the firing con-
travened public policy. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 177, 610
P.2d 1330, 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 InI. 2d 172, 185,
384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (1979) (discharging an employee for filing worker's compensation claim
contravened public policy); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1975)
(employer held for abusive discharge in firing employee for serving on a jury); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action stated where employee
was terminated for attempting to urge employer to comply with consumer protection laws).
"ll See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346-47 (E.D. Mich.
1980). The defendant will be liable under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
harm only where his conduct is extreme and outrageous, causing severe emotional distress.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRs § 46(1), at 71 (1965). Liability under this theory will ac-
crue "only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." Id. comment d, at 73. Hence, this theory has been
utilized by employees to recover damages in cases where the employer acted "outrageously"
in discharging the employee. See Richey v. American Auto Ass'n, 9 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733, 406
N.E.2d 675, 676 (Mass. 1980)(employer can be held liable for damages resulting from outra-
geous conduct in discharging employee); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145,
355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976) (waitress stated cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional harm when she was fired as part of restaurant manager's plan to discharge waitresses
in alphabetical order until he was given information regarding recent thefts).
118 See, e.g., Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Keating v. BBDO Int'l, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In New York, five
elements must be established for an action to lie in prima facie tort- "(1) the intentional
infliction of harm; (2) without excuse or justification; (3) by an act ... which would other-
wise be lawful; (4) resulting in actual temporal damage; and (5) not classified as any other
recognized tort." 517 F. Supp. at 24; see also McCullough v. Certain Teed Prods. Corp., 70
App. Div. 2d 771, 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (4th Dep't 1979); Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d
1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), afl'd, 70 App. Div. 2d 791,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979). Although New York has not allowed recovery on this
theory, see Kushner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 76 App. Div. 2d 950, 950, 428 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746
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breach of contract.117 In New York, actions based upon these theo-
ries of liability generally have been unsuccessful."" Recently, how-
ever, in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.," 9 the Court of Appeals held
that an employee who is hired for no specific duration can main-
tain a breach of contract action for wrongful termination based
upon representations regarding job security made by members of
the employer's staff and contained in the employer's personnel
handbook. 20
(3d Dep't 1980); Cartwright v. Golub Corp., 51 App. Div. 2d 407, 409, 381 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902
(3d Dep't 1976), the Chin court left such a possibility open by simply stating that the plain-
tiff had "failed to demonstrate the required elements," 96 Misc. 2d at 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d at
740. Recovery has been quite limited in this area, however, primarily because "[t]he plead-
ing must demonstrate an exclusive malicious motivation for the acts of [the employer]," id.
at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739, and in order to prevail, the employee must specifically plead
his actual damages, McCullough v. Certainteed Prods. Corp., 70 App. Div. 2d 771, 771, 417
N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (4th Dep't 1979).
117 See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1256 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 611, 292 N.W.2d 880,
890-91 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). Most
courts which have allowed recovery in contract for the termination of an employment-at-will
relationship have implied an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
contract, as is present in other contracts. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 103, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1977). In addition, some courts have found
implied-in-fact promises or detrimental reliance in order to uphold the employer's action,
see Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 611, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (1980);
Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 261-62, 283 N.W.2d 713, 717
(1979); see also Note, supra note 112, at 1820, while.others have considered whether person-
nel handbooks which assure continued employment absent "just cause" for discharge are
enforceable promises, see, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 892; see infra
note 120.
118 See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 88 App. Div. 2d 870, 871, 451
N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't 1982); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 App. Div. 2d 553, 553-54,
425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1st Dep't 1980); Stewart v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1982, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1982); Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc.
2d 1070, 1076, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 741 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), affd, 70 App. Div. 2d
791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979).
119 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
120 Id. at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195. Most courts that have considered
the enforceability of assurances in personnel handbooks that discharge will only be for just
cause have not found an enforceable promise. See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54-55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 App. Div.
2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1st Dep't 1980); Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1072-
73, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), af'd, 70 App. Div. 2d 791, 416
N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979); HARvARD Note, supra note 112, at 1820-21. In general, per-
sonnel handbooks are viewed as unilateral expressions of company policy, lacking in mutual-
ity of obligation and, therefore, not considered part of the employment contract. See John-
son v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976); see also Shaw
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 5-6, 328 N.E.2d 775, 778-79 (1975); Edwards v. Citibank,
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In Weiner, the plaintiff engaged in a series of discussions with
a representative of McGraw-Hill, Inc., in which the plaintiff was
assured that the company adhered to a policy, outlined in the com-
pany's personnel handbook, of terminating employees only for
"just cause" and after a chance for rehabilitation. 121 In addition,
the employment application form signed and submitted by the
plaintiff indicated that the employment would be in conformity
with the personnel handbook. 122 The plaintiff was hired and re-
mained in the defendant's employ for 8 years, until February 1977,
at which time the plaintiff's employment was terminated for "lack
of application.' 1 23 Thereafter the plaintiff brought suit on the the-
ories of abusive discharge, implied promise of good faith and fair
dealing, and breach of contract. 2 4 Distinguishing this case from
those in which an employee had not been bound to a handbook's
contents,12 5 Special Term upheld the breach of contract action.' 2
A divided Appellate Division, First Department reversed, holding
that the plaintiff could be released "at any time and for any or no
N.A., 74 App. Div. 2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (lst Dep't 1980). Courts from jurisdic-
tions other than New York holding that the personnel handbook is a binding part of the
employment contract generally have been decided under the facts and circumstances of each
case. See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 335, 563 P.2d 54, 59 (1977);
Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058-59, 322 N.E.2d
574, 576 (App. Ct. 1974).
In Toussaint, the Supreme Court of Michigan adopted a liberal approach, stating that
when an employer establishes personnel policies and procedures, and makes them known to
the employees, "the employment relationship is presumably enhanced." 408 Mich. at 613,
292 N.W.2d at 892. A personnel policy is legally enforceable by an employee-at-will in the
event that it becomes part of the employment contract; this can result by express written or
oral agreement, or from the employees "legitimate expectations" grounded in the employer's
policy statements. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
121 57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
122 Id. The printed employment form stated that Weiner's employment would be sub-
ject to the provisions of McGraw-Hill's "handbook on personnel policies and procedures."
Id. The handbook provided that "[t]he company will resort to dismissal for just and suffi-
cient cause only, and only after all practical steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the
employee have been taken and failed." Id.
123 Id. at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 442-43, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194-95. The plaintiff had left his
previous employer, Prentice-Hall, and thereby forfeited accrued fringe benefits and a salary
increase that had been proffered to induce him to stay. Id., 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d
at 194. The defendant's representatives told the plaintiff that employment with McGraw-
Hill would "bring him the advantage of job security." Id. at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 194.
124 Id. at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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reason" since he had been hired at will.127
The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the record evi-
denced the existence of a contract and its breach sufficient to sus-
tain a cause of action. 28 Writing for the majority,129 Judge Fuchs-
berg initially noted the history of the employment-at-will doctrine
and the growing trend favoring reform of this strict principle.13 1
Further, reasoning that mutuality is not always an essential ele-
ment of a contract when consideration is present, the Court ob-
served that although an employee has the right to leave the com-
pany when he wishes, an employer nevertheless may have
bargained away his right to terminate.'' As long as the considera-
tion is a benefit to the promisee or a detriment to the promisor,12
reasoned the Court, the plaintiff's services are valid consideration
for the defendant's promise. 33 Accordingly, Judge Fuchsberg de-
termined that "an agreement on the part of the employer not to
dismiss except for 'good and sufficient cause only'" does not "in-
eluctabl[y]" result in employment at will. 34 Finally, reminding the
trial court that hiring for an indefinite term gives rise to merely a
rebuttable presumption of at-will terminability, 3 5 the Court con-
cluded that the totality of circumstances combined to present a
question of fact as to whether the defendant was bound to his
promise not to discharge without sufficient cause. 3
127 83 App. Div. 2d 810, 811, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (1st Dep't 1981). Justice Kupferman
dissented, stating that he could not agree that "an employee handbook on personnel policies
and procedures is a corporate illusion .... ." Id. (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
128 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The Court stated that
because the plaintiff established a sustainable cause of action in breach of contract, it was
not necessary to address the arguments for abusive discharge and implied promise of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195. The Court also
noted that the Statute of Frauds argument was not an obstacle since the contract, by its
terms, could be performed in less than 1 year. Id. at 463, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at
196.
129 Chief Judge Cooke, Judges Jasen, Jones and Meyer joined in the majority opinion
written by Judge Fuchsberg. Judge Gabrielli joined in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Wachtler.
1SO 57 N.Y.2d at 462-63, 443 N.E.2d at 443-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96; see supra note
112.
131 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
122 See Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 546, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (1891) (self-denial of
liquor and tobacco was adequate consideration for the promise to pay a sum of money).
122 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (quoting 1A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963)).
12 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
126 Id. at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
128 Id. at 466-67, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198. The Court considered the
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wachtler argued that there is
no question of fact for the jury since neither the application form
nor the personnel handbook evidenced any intent on the part of
the defendant to be bound by such a promise. 3 7 Judge Wachtler
stated that in the absence of an agreement providing for the dura-
tion of employment, traditional employment-at-will principles
should apply.' a In addition, the dissent opined that public policy
militated against broadly construing the personnel handbook and
the application form to find a contract, 39 because the limitation on
the employer's right to discharge could cause inefficiency in the
workplace as well as encourage companies to relocate in states ad-
hering to the more traditional rule. 40
In concluding that the Weiner circumstances established a
sustainable cause of action in breach of contract, 141 it is submitted
that the Court significantly retreated from the rigidity of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. 42 This departure comports with the
more enlightened view of a number of foreign'M and American ju-
following factors: (1) the plaintiff was induced to leave his previous position based upon the
defendant's assurances; (2) these assurances were expressed in the application form and the
personnel handbook; (3) during his employment, the plaintiff routinely rejected other offers
of employment; and, (4) in his position as a director, he was expected to comply with the
handbook procedure in terminating other employees. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197.
,37 Id. at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
I- Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge
Wachtler examined the application form and personnel handbook and argued that the form
was merely "for internal record-keeping purposes" and the handbook was a statement of
"broad internal policy guidelines generally followed." Id. at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 App.
Div. 2d 810, 811, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11-12 (1st Dep't 1981) (the application form never rose to
the level of an employment agreement because it did not spell out the critical terms of the
employment such as duration).
139 57 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 468-69, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
142 Recently, there has been a growing recognition in the United States of the need for
reform in the employment-at-will doctrine. See Blades, supra note 112, at 1405, 1418 n.69;
DeGiuseppe, supra note 112, at 2; HARvARD Note, supra note 112, at 1816-17; HASTINGS
Note, supra note 113, at 1436; ST. JOHN'S Note, supra note 113, at 566-67. John Feerick,
presently the Dean of Fordham University School of Law, stated that "employers would be
well advised to examine their policies and procedures for terminating employees so as to
guard against arbitrary, malicious and unfair terminations." Feerick, Erosion of Rule on
Employment At Will, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
13 While American courts are just beginning to deviate from the strictures of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, see supra notes 112, 114-17 and accompanying text, the ideas of
"stability of employment" and "job security" are commonplace in many other industrialized
countries, Committee on Labor Law, supra note 112, at 175. By statute, Great Britain,
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risdictions."" Indeed, contrary to Judge Wachtler's fear concerning
workplace efficiency, it is persuasively contended that enhancing
job security results in increased productivity and a more coopera-
tive work environment. 145
It is further submitted that the Weiner facts lent themselves
more to the remedies of promissory estoppel or implied promise of
good faith and fair dealing than to a contractual intent theory.146
The result is that the success of future employee-plaintiffs who
rely on the employer's personnel handbook to support breach of
contract actions remains unclear. Because the Court failed to artic-
ulate clearly a standard for when a breach of contract action lies
for an employee induced to accept employment by representations
of job security, 147 the Weiner holding must be viewed purely as sui
generis. 148 Ostensibly, the result places employers in a precarious
position in that a determination of contractual intent on the part
of the employer can be more equivocal. Notwithstanding this in-
creased employer vulnerability, however, employers can protect
themselves from unexpected liability merely by including disclaim-
ers in written employment representations, 49 or by requiring em-
ployees to agree expressly to employment at will. 5 0 In sum, it is
France, Japan and West Germany, among others, provide protection for employees who pass
a probationary period, provide for money damages in the event of unjust dismissal, and in
some instances, provide the remedy of reinstatement in addition to money damages. Id.
"' See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
' HARVARD Note, supra note 112, at 1836; see also Feerick, Developments in Em-
ployee Rights, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
146 See supra notes 123 and 136 and accompanying text. Other courts when presented
with similar factual situations have not proceeded on a strict contractual intent theory, but
rather, have imposed an obligation of good faith and fair dealing, or, alternatively, have
focused on implied-in-fact promises or detrimental reliance. See supra note 117. Present in
Weiner were explicit assurances on the part of the defendant and consequent detrimental
reliance. 57 N.Y.2d at 460-61, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194; see Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 611, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890-91 (1980).
147 See 57 N.Y.2d at 465-67, 443 N.E.2d at 445-46, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98 (such cases
must be decided on conduct and intent of parties, and attendant facts and circumstances).
148 Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
149 See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 612-14, 302 N.W.2d 307,
312 (1981); Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 95, 261 N.W.2d 222, 224 (1977).
It should be borne in mind by employers that oral and written assurances of job security
may negate the effect of disclaimers. Id. at 95, 261 N.W.2d at 224; see also 102 Mich. App.
at 612-14, 302 N.W.2d at 312.
" See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 612, 292 N.W.2d
880, 891 (1980). In Toussaint, the court stated that an employer could assure that employ-
ees were hired at will by establishing a "company policy of requiring prospective employees"
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submitted that the Weiner decision aligns New York with the
more progressive view of the employment relationship with no con-
comitant undue hardship on the employer.
Daniel P. Venora
Evidence obtained through a police informant in a noncustodial
setting must be suppressed if the police knew that the defendant
was represented by counsel on a pending, unrelated criminal
charge
The New York Court of Appeals traditionally has afforded a
broad construction to a criminal defendant's right to counsel. 151
The right to counsel attaches when the accused requests the aid of
an attorney, when formal proceedings against the defendant com-
mence, or when an attorney enters the proceeding, 152 and state-
to agree to this as a condition of their employment. Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891. The
employer can protect himself by entering into a written contract explicitly stating that the
employment is at will, id. at 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891 n.24; see Novosel v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (relying on the exception elicited in
Toussaint to find no right of "just cause" dismissal for employers); DeGiuseppe, supra note
112, at 48, for "[i]f the employment agreement expressly permits a discharge for any reason
whatsoever, courts would, under contract theory, be helpless to protect the employee from
abusive discharge," HASTINGS Note, supra note 113, at 1455.
151 Note, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 351,
351 (1982). The Court of Appeals has described as "a cherished principle" the right of the
defendant under the state constitution to place an attorney between himself and the "awe-
some power of the sovereign." People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613,
412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978); see N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the right to counsel in New York has developed independently of the sixth amendment
guarantee contained in the federal Constitution. 46 N.Y.2d at 161, 385 N.E.2d at 615, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 877. As a result, a defendant, in many respects, has a broader right to counsel
under New York law than he does under federal law. See Galie, State Constitutional Guar-
antees and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 157, 178 & n.149 (1979).
Exemplifying New York's broad interpretation of the right to counsel is the rule that
once the right to counsel attaches, the defendant cannot effectively waive his privilege
against self-incrimination or his right to counsel, unless the waiver is made in the presence
of an attorney. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976). This principle has been said to "[breathe] life into the requirement that a
waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent and voluntary." Id.; accord
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 29, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (1980);
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422
(1980).
152 In the early 1960's, the Court of Appeals expansively defined the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination as those rights are embodied in the state consti-
tution. The Court held that upon the indictment of an accused, formal proceedings com-
